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INTRODUCTION
JAMES W. ELLIS*
The Americans with Disabilities Act' ("ADA") is one of the most
striking political accomplishments by and on behalf of people with disabilities in our history. It represents a national recognition that people
with disabling conditions are entitled to participate fully in the lives of
their communities, not as a consequence of charity but as a matter of
right.'
The political circumstances that led to the passage of this legislation
are described briefly by Senator Domenici in his Preface to this Symposium
issue.' The purpose of this Introduction is to provide background on
some of the efforts to ensure equal treatment that preceded the intro-

duction of the ADA. 4 These efforts involved both the courts and the
Congress. Both the successes and the failures of these earlier efforts help
explain the remarkable consensus that developed in recent years that
Congressional prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability was
both needed and likely to be successful.
The beginning of modern efforts to achieve legal equality for people

with disabilities can be traced to the efforts to prevent exclusion of
children with disabilities from the nation's public schools. The belief that
it was acceptable to exclude such children, even within the context of
mandatory attendance laws, was well entrenched. For example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin approved the exclusion of a boy with cerebral
palsy because he "produces a depressing and nauseating effect upon the

teachers and school children." 5 Such practices were frequently sanctioned
in the compulsory attendance laws themselves, or even in state consti-

tutions. The New Mexico Constitution provides, for example, an exception
for children not having "sufficient physical and mental ability.' '6
These practices of excluding children with disabilities were attacked as
unconstitutional in the early 1970s. In two leading cases, Pennsylvania

* Henry Weihofen Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. A.B., Occidental College;
J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor Ellis testified in favor of the Americans with
Disabilities Act before the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives in
his capacity as President of the American Association on Mental Retardation. Professor Ellis was
also counsel of record for seven national disability organizations as amici curiae before the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985).
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
2. See Ellis, Presidential Address 1990 - Mental Retardation at the Close of the 20th Century:
A New Realism, 28 MENTAL RETARDATION 263 (1990).
3. 22 N.M.L. Rv. 1 (1992) (this issue).
4. This brief article does not purport to be a comprehensive history, or to describe all the
important events that preceded the enactment of the ADA. My purpose is merely to sketch some
context and describe part of the background for the congressional action.
5. State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Education, 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153, 154 (1919).
6. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
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Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,7 and Mills v. Board
of Education,8 exclusionary policies were held to be violative of the equal
protection rights of children with mental retardation. 9 Each of these cases
was limited in the scope of its enforcement to the jurisdiction in which
it was decided, and neither reached the Supreme Court of the United

States.' 0 As a result there was no clear national mandate to provide

education to all children with disabilities.
That mandate was provided by Congress in 1975 with the passage of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, now renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")." Under this statute, all children with disabilities were entitled to a "free appropriate
public education."1 2 Its implementation has meant that millions of children
who previously would have been excluded from public school have been
enrolled and educated. In addition, the statute has required school districts
to reduce or eliminate the segregation of students with disabilities from
nondisabled students. a
During the same approximate period of time as the passage of the
prohibition on educational discrimination, Congress also passed a statute
forbidding discrimination against people with disabilities by any recipient
of federal funding. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against any "otherwise qualified individual" in any federally
funded program. 14 This statute pursued the model of other civil rights
7. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), on remand, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent
decree).
8. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
9. The Pennsylvania case ("PARC") involved the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Mills case involved the equal protection "component" of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
10. It is worth noting that these victories, in the absence of legislation, probably could not be
replicated under current constitutional doctrine and before the current membership of the Supreme
Court of the United States. In cases subsequent to PARC and Mills, the Court has made clear
that it does not consider mental retardation to be a suspect or semi-suspect class and that in its
view education is not a fundamental right. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In the absence of
either of the "triggers" of heightened judicial scrutiny, the exclusion of children with disabilities
would be evaluated under the rational basis test. Although some Justices have suggested that total
exclusion from public schools would invite a different analysis, see, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), it is far from certain that the Court would not defer to an argument by local school
officials that they had a reasoned basis for excluding children with disabilities who would be difficult
and expensive to educate. See generally Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988)
(suggesting limits to the Plyler rationale); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (importance
of judicial deference to the judgments of the government's professionals in the area of developmental
disabilities).
11. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). This statute has been commonly
known by its public law designation, Pub. L. 94-142. When the law was reauthorized and amended
in 1990 it was renamed the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act." Pub. L. 101-476.
12. See generally H.R. TURNBULL & A. TURNBULL, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: LAW

(1978).
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B) (West Supp. 1992) (state must ensure that "to the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with children who are not disabled, and
that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature and severity of the disability is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily").
14. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1991).
AND IMPLEMENTATION
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statutes that had prohibited discrimination on the basis of race and
gender. 5 Because of the extensive scope of federally funded activities in
protection against discrimination to
American life, section 504 extended
6
a significant number of areas.'
But despite the success of these statutes,' 7 a great deal of the discrimination encountered by people with disabilities remained outside the scope
of the law's prohibitions. By the mid-1980s, discrimination was prohibited
in the public schools and by recipients of federal funding, but in almost
no other circumstances. At that time, a major effort was made to achieve
recognition that invidious discrimination on the basis of disability was
unconstitutional.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,8 the Supreme Court
of the United States was asked to decide whether people with mental

retardation

9

were entitled to the judicial protection afforded to racial

minorities, women, and others under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Fifth Circuit had held that mental retardation
to such considwas a semi-suspect classification, 20 and therefore entitled
2
eration. The Supreme Court held that it was not. 1
The traditional factors considered by the Court in deciding whether a
class is disadvantaged in a way that requires special judicial protection
include a history of invidious discrimination, immutability of the trait,
and political powerlessness and disenfranchisement. 22 In Cleburne, the
Court considered each of these factors as they related to people with
mental retardation. The Justices acknowledged that there was a substantial
and persistent history of invidious discrimination against people with
mental retardation. Indeed, five members of the Court chose to characterize this history of mistreatment as "grotesque. ' 23 Furthermore, no
15. For a discussion of the origins of section 504, see R. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DissalrY POLICY (1984).

16. Debates about public transportation have been among the most prominent topics of discussion
and litigation under section 504. See, e.g., R. KATZMAN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF
TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED (1986); Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful

Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 1471 (1987); Note, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in Public
Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863 (1988). A less controversial, but more obvious manifestation of
504 is the required removal of physical barriers to public facilities.
17. Another, more recent, statutory approach was the enactment of the Fair Housing Amendments
of 1988. This statute made it unlawful, for the first time, to discriminate on the basis of handicap
in the provision of housing. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f) (West Supp. 1991).
18. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
19. The case involved people with mental retardation, rather than the broader class of all people
with mental and physical disabilities. Because mental retardation is a readily and objectively identifiable
disability and because the history of invidious discrimination against this group was particularly
virulent, it presented the strongest claim for constitutional protection from discrimination.
20. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
21. For a fuller discussion of Cleburne, see Minow, When Difference Has its Home: Group
Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987).
22. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
23. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J. and Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Cleburne
Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984); id. at 461 (Marshall, J.,
Brennan, J.,and Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice questioned the fact that mental retardation is an immutable trait. 24
The claim for protected constitutional status foundered on two considerations. The first was disenfranchisement. The majority noted that
Congress and state legislatures had enacted a number of laws benefitting
people with mental retardation, including the Education of the Handicapped Act and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act. The existence of these laws, declared the majority, "negates
any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the25sense
that they have no ability to attract the attention of lawmakers."
The second, and apparently more significant reason for rejecting a
recognition of the need for heightened scrutiny, was the majority's view
that mental retardation was a classification that legislators could use for
some legitimate purposes. As a result, it would be unwise to subject any
laws using the classification to more than minimal judicial scrutiny. In
other words, because the classification was not presumptively irrelevant
to all legitimate legislative goals, its use would be presumed to be legitimate. 26
The net result was that after Cleburne, laws disadvantaging people
with mental retardation or any other disability would be evaluated under
the most deferential standard, the so-called rational basis test. The courts
would presume such laws to be constitutional, and therefore would seldom
intervene on behalf of citizens with disabilities. 27 Constitutional challenge
to laws that disadvantage people with disabilities therefore became, in
most cases, unrealistic.
It is against this backdrop of patchwork federal legislation and a
judicially-closed door to constitutional litigation that the Congress considered the ADA. The ADA extended federal protection from discrimination beyond the schools and beyond the reach of federal funding. It
reached private discriminatory conduct that would have been beyond the
scope of constitutional protection even if the Court had granted heightened
protection in Cleburne. And, most importantly, it articulated a clear
national statement that discrimination on the basis of disability was as
offensive and unacceptable to the American people as discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, or age.
The precise extent to which the ADA will change the way America
does business, and the number of previously closed doors it will open

24. See, e.g., id. at 442.
25. Id. at 445. Paradoxically, the passage of ADA could be read as additional confirmation of
the Court's perspective.
26. For discussion of presumptive irrelevance, see Ellis, On the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 375 (1986).
27. Confusion has predictably resulted from the fact that the Court announced that heightened
scrutiny was constitutionally unwarranted and inappropriate, but then proceeded to analyze the
statute in issue with a methodology that appeared to involve the principal elements of heightened
scrutiny. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1444 (2d ed. 1988); J. NOWAK & R.
ROTUNDA,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

590 n.69 (4th ed. 1991); Minow, supra note 21 at 116; Ellis, supra

note 26 at 376 n.7. This doctrinal ambiguity has left lower courts to sort out whether they are
supposed to employ the test that the Supreme Court announced or the one that the Court appears
to have used. Most courts appear to have chosen the deferential standard. See, e.g., In re Harhut,
385 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1986).
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for Americans with disabilities remains to be seen; a full evaluation will
have to await years of litigation and judicial interpretation. It is important
to recognize at the beginning of this effort, however, how dramatic and
important the enactment itself is. The articles in this Symposium demonstrate the importance of what Congress has accomplished and suggest
some of the directions in which the changes it requires will take us.
The Americans with Disabilities Act is a profound statement about the
role of people with disabilities in their communities and in their nation.
One small measure of how far we have come can be seen in a statute
uncovered in preparing the amicus brief in Cleburne. In 1920, Mississippi
passed a statute granting jurisdiction to its state courts "in all cases of
legal inquiry in regard to feeblemindedness, including idiocy, imbecility,
and the higher grades and varieties of mental inferiority which renders
the subjects unfit for citizenship. ' ' 28 If the ADA were to accomplish
nothing else, it would definitively declare that no disability renders any
individual unfit for citizenship.

28. Act of April 3, 1920, ch. 210, § 17, 1920 Miss. Laws 288, 294 (emphasis added).

